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The Treaty on Establishment of the Eurasian Economic
Community was signed on October 10, 2000, by the presi-
dents of five Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
countries: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Fed-
eration, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan applied for membership
in 2005 and was formally accepted in 2006, but suspended
its membership in December 2008. Additionally, Armenia,
Moldova, and Ukraine have “associated status.” EurAsEC’s
original building block is the treaty creating a CU compris-
ing Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia; that treaty was signed
on March 29, 1996. EurAsEC’s main stated aims are, first,
the ultimate (re)creation of a CU; and, later, development of
a “single economic space” among its members, all of which
were part of the former Soviet Union.
Discussions about the creation of such a common eco-
nomic space involving the four largest CIS economies (re-
spectively, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) result-
ed in an agreement of principle toward that aim, signed on
February 23, 2003. However, the political developments in
Ukraine in 2004 (compounded by Ukraine’s World Trade
Organization [WTO] accession in 2008 and the ongoing ne-
gotiations for a “deep free trade area” with the European
Union [EU]) have limited Ukraine’s involvement in this
process. In a meeting on August 16, 2006, therefore, a deci-
sion was made to establish a CU within the EurAsEC frame-
work, comprising only Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia as
initial members. The other EurAsEC members will join this
CU when their economies are ready.
That decision received a significant boost with a surprise
announcement in mid-2009: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Rus-
sia declared that they would aim for a joint WTO accession
after the creation of a CU among their three countries. This
announcement was seen by some as reflecting the Russian
government’s growing disillusion with its very lengthy WTO
accession  process  (initiated  in  mid-1993  and  now  the
longest-running effort of its kind in the history of the WTO);
and was seen by others as confirming the limited commit-
ment to reform that led to this lengthy accession process in
the first place.1A “customs union commission” would be the
CU managing body within the EurAsEC structure, comple-
This note provides an initial estimation of some of the economic effects of creating the Eurasian Economic
Community (EurAsEC) customs union. Relying on the computable general equilibrium model from the Global
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), results of the simulations consistently support the conclusion that, as an
arrangement, the EurAsEC customs union (CU) would be a GDP-reducing framework in which the negative
trade-diversion effects surpass positive trade-creation ones.mented by other structures (among them, the Interstate
Council [where heads of state and government sit and which
is the main decision-making body] and the Court [which
acts as a CU dispute settlement mechanism, with apparent
supranational powers]).
The introduction of a common external tariff (CET)
schedule based on the 2007 amendment to the Harmonized
System nomenclature and the elimination of nontariff bar-
riers among those three countries were slated for January 1,
2010. Remarkably, given the complexity of such tasks, this
deadline was achieved. Nevertheless, some very important
elements (for instance, division of customs revenues among
the three states) were not completed until the end of 2010.
Additionally, the energy sector—a crucial economic sector
for all three countries—has been integrated in a limited fash-
ion into the initial harmonization effort.
The EurAsEC point of departure was an already signifi-
cant level of tariff schedules convergence between Belarus
and Russia. As a result of the further harmonization intro-
duced with the CET in early-2010, 7 percent of Belarus’ ap-
proximately 11,200 tariff lines increased and 18 percent de-
creased.  Among  other  items,  tariffs  on  meat  products,
metals, and motor cars increased; those on apparel, footwear,
machinery, mechanical appliances, and pharmaceutical sub-
stances decreased. In Kazakhstan, 10 percent of the tariff
lines increased and 45 percent decreased. Increases were
seen on means of transportation, wood, refrigeration equip-
ment, pharmaceutical preparations, electro-mechanical do-
mestic appliances, footwear, and apparel; there were decreas-
es on agricultural products, hides and skins, and optical
medical or surgical instruments and appliances. In Russia, 14
percent of the tariffs increased and 4 percent decreased. Tar-
iffs on meat products, yeast, and some articles of apparel and
clothing accessories rose; those on fruit concentrates, baby
food, materials for photography, wool and fabrics, pharma-
ceutical substances, parts of footwear, and electromechanical
appliances decreased.2
In other words, with the exception of Kazakhstan, the
clear majority of the nontrade-weighted tariff lines actually
remained unaffected. To a point, as noted above, that reflects
the already high degree of harmonization that existed be-
tween Belarus and Russia (see figure 1). 
Estimating the CU Effects: The Model and
the Data Set
This note will produce an initial estimation of the GDP, sec-
toral output, and trade flows arising from the creation of the
EurAsEC CU. It must be said that, in principle, what (if any)
significant economic change could arise from this process is
unclear because the economies were already largely integrat-
ed in terms of trade. For instance, they were integrated via
the formally liberalized intra-CIS trade and the free trade
area of Belarus and Russia. Several studies show that Belarus
already “overtrades” with the CIS/Russia by more than 200
percent.3 Namely, further negative GDP and welfare trade-
diversion effects (that is, the dislocation of trade flows to
less-efficient trade partners because of the introduction of a
trade “tax wedge”) may be greater than any potential posi-
tive trade-creation ones, resulting in a regional trade arrange-
ment that will be detrimental to the economies of the coun-
tries involved.
The framework that will be used for such estimations
here is the GTAP model (RunGTAP, version 3.53) and
GTAP 7 Data Base.4The current GTAP database has 57 eco-
nomic sectors, which were aggregated here in the 15 sectors
described in table 1. This reduced aggregation was chosen to
facilitate the estimation process, while preserving enough
detail to include the sectors most likely to be significantly af-
fected by the CU (among them, energy and autos) and to in-
clude those sectors of greater importance for the national
economies involved.
The set of input-output matrixes and tariff and tax data
requirements of the GTAP 7 Data Base have been signifi-
cantly expanded to CIS countries.5 Additionally, its input-
output matrix for Russia was updated. The total number of
countries now covered by the GTAP model stands at 113,
but this figure was aggregated in the set of 10 countries/re-
gions enumerated in table 2, encompassing all the EurAsEC
CU members and their most relevant trade partners. 
Estimating the CU Effects: The Results
It is important to point out that the convergence toward a
CET does not simply imply a transposition of the existing
Russian tariff lines to the other members of the CU. The
Russian tariff schedule itself also changed (as was apparent
in figure 1). Nor does it mean full harmonization. For in-
stance, Kazakhstan was allowed to apply tariffs different
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no change increase decreasefrom those agreed in the CET to more than 400 tariff lines
for a transition period lasting until 2015. There are also tariff
quota lists for several products (usually those of an agricul-
tural or husbandry nature) that vary for each CU member;
and for 2010 at least, those lists are to be managed at the na-
tional level. Finally, as indicated above, there is the all-impor-
tant question of the terms and time frame for incorporating
the energy-related industries into the CU.6
These matters are further complicated by the fact that
there is no full equivalency between the individual (or ag-
gregate) CET tariff lines and the GTAP sectors and their re-
spective tariffs (which are also calculated there as trade-
weighted ones and so are country-specific), which introduce
many constraints to any modeling exercise. Therefore, the
simulated tariff changes necessarily will have an approxi-
mate and indicative value relative to the actually observed
changes. Of course, this does not invalidate the exercise be-
cause, by its very nature, any economic modeling effort al-
ways produces only indicative outcomes.
With these provisos in mind, what do the results tell us?
First, an estimation is made of the CU implementation (par-
allel to a full removal of any remaining taxes between the
CU members), excluding the energy-related sectors (name-
ly, crude oil, gas, and processed petroleum products). The re-
sults are shown in table 3. Aggregate GDP results are either
unambiguously negative (Belarus and Russia) or nonsignifi-
cant (Kazakhstan) for the CU members, and largely irrele-
vant for all the other main EurAsEC CU trade partners.7
Looking at the results at an industry level, they are roughly
as one would expect, with the exception of the somewhat
counterintuitive gains in the textile/apparel and truck (or,
more precisely, “other transport equipment”) sectors for Be-
larus and Kazakhstan and the exception of autos and heavy
manufacturing for Belarus (given the greater tariffs, to ap-
proximate the Russian level).8 Most other sectors experience
noteworthy losses. Also, the trade balance worsens by ap-
proximately US$4 billion in Russia, is unchanged for Be-
larus, and improves by roughly US$350 million in Kaza-
khstan. (Both Kazakhstan and Russia usually run large trade
surpluses, whereas Belarus traditionally experiences large
trade deficits.)
Alternatively, one may estimate a scenario in which, with
the implementation of the CU, there is a limited harmoniza-
tion of the conditions in the energy sector—namely, crude
oil and gas are traded in equal terms and processed petrole-
um products remain outside the CU. One might think of
this as the central scenario in the short to medium term, giv-
en the difficult discussions concerning changes in taxation of
the Belarusian exports of processed oil products (based on
Russian crude oil imports).9These results are shown in table
4. The GDP effects now are negative across the board for the
CU members, and the GDP losses experienced by Belarus
(the country that arguably benefits more than other CIS
economies from relatively preferential trade terms in gas and
crude oil) almost double to more than 6 percent of GDP.
Also for Belarus, the sectoral effects are now negative for al-
most all sectors, except the important petroleum products
industry, which has significant positive gains and in this sce-
nario is assumed not to be harmonized. The gains probably
show that factors of production in sectors negatively affected
migrate to this protected sector, increasing its output. Russia,
with almost 90 percent of the EurAsEC CU aggregate GDP,
has a GDP loss of more than 1 percent. The auto industry in
Russia benefits somewhat, at the significant expense of that
industry in its CU partners (as do Russia’s textile/apparel
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Source: GTAP, modified by the author.
Table 1. Sectors of the Model Used in the Simulations
Sector Description
01 Petrol Petroleum, coal products
02 GasOil Gas and oil
03 Financial Financial services not classified elsewhere
04 Truck Transport equipment not classified elsewhere
05 Auto Motor vehicles and parts
06 GrainsCrops Wheat, cereal, and grains not classified elsewhere, 
vegetables, fruits
07 MeatLstk Meat and meat products, animal products not 
classified elsewhere
08 Extraction Coal, minerals not classified elsewhere, forestry, 
fishing
09 ProcFood Dairy and food products, sugar, beverages, tobacco
10 TextWapp Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products
11 LightMnfc Wood and paper products, metal products not 
classified elsewhere
12 HeavyMnfc Chemical, rubber, plastic, and mineral products not 
classified elsewhere; electronic and machinery 
equipment
13 Util_Cons Electricity, heating, water and gas manufacturing and 
distribution, construction
14 TransComm Sea, air, and land transport not classified elsewhere; 
trade and communication
15 Other services Insurance, business services not classified elsewhere, 
public administration
Source: GTAP, modified by the author.










10 Rest of the world4 POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
Source: Author’s estimations.
Table 3. Simulation Results of CU without Harmonization of Energy Sectors
GDP CHANGES
Russian  Rest of
Federation Belarus Kazakhstan Ukraine China Rest of Asia Americas EU-27 Africa the world
–0.38 –3.20 0.04 0.00 –0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 –0.08
Sector Output changes per sector
Petrol 0.15 0.66 –1.45 0.15 –0.10 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.08 0.01
GasOil 2.58 –0.45 2.77 –0.81 –0.54 –0.59 –0.54 –0.72 –0.48 –0.56
Financial 0.84 1.03 1.27 –0.04 0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.03 0.04 0.05
Truck –11.54 12.47 6.40 –1.47 0.14 0.00 0.06 –0.03 1.22 0.77
Auto 1.16 8.58 –24.61 –1.75 0.01 –0.06 0.00 –0.04 0.54 0.05
GrainsCrops –0.21 –3.92 –5.34 –0.21 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.19 0.20
MeatLstk 1.76 –4.19 –1.31 –0.51 0.00 0.00 –0.08 –0.03 –0.07 0.01
Extraction –1.74 –6.51 –4.74 –0.89 0.00 –0.06 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.11
ProcFood –2.27 –5.76 –2.53 –1.52 0.20 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.18
TextWapp –2.70 7.10 11.37 1.18 –0.25 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.64 0.61
LightMnfc –2.22 –3.69 0.82 –2.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.74 0.40
HeavyMnfc –11.38 5.76 –11.84 –0.01 0.09 0.06 0.17 0.22 1.39 0.94
Util_Cons –1.30 –0.45 –1.14 0.28 –0.03 0.04 –0.03 –0.09 –0.16 –0.32
TransComm 1.80 –0.87 1.51 –0.01 –0.03 –0.02 0.00 –0.01 0.07 –0.06
Other services 1.99 –3.04 3.74 0.13 0.01 0.00 –0.01 –0.02 –0.12 –0.06
Source: Author’s estimations.
Table 4. Simulation Results of CU with Partial Harmonization of Energy Sectors
GDP CHANGES
Russian  Rest of
Federation Belarus Kazakhstan Ukraine China Rest of Asia Americas EU-27 Africa the world
––1.25 –6.26 –0.43 0.07 –0.04 0.00 0.00 –0.05 0.00 –0.10
Sector Output changes per sector
Petrol 8.53 210.78 75.94 4.34 –0.66 –0.37 –0.50 –4.18 –1.37 –3.33
GasOil 0.01 –44.97 –1.94 –3.45 0.50 0.42 0.22 0.91 0.40 0.65
Financial 2.11 –4.26 –0.35 –0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 –0.01 –0.06 –0.02
Truck –2.85 –10.22 9.74 –4.85 0.08 0.18 –0.03 0.05 –0.99 –0.02
Auto 4.71 –8.24 –23.33 –3.18 –0.03 0.04 –0.07 –0.07 –0.27 –0.39
GrainsCrops –0.06 –3.96 –5.94 –0.58 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.09 0.09
MeatLstk 0.29 –3.84 0.08 –0.75 0.00 0.01 –0.10 –0.01 0.04 0.03
Extraction 1.13 –5.88 –2.89 –0.93 –0.04 –0.08 –0.05 –0.03 –0.18 –0.09
ProcFood –1.98 –6.08 –2.55 –2.38 0.19 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.16
TextWapp 1.06 –26.60 2.92 –1.83 –0.11 0.18 0.04 0.08 –0.45 –0.29
LightMnfc 2.42 –18.83 –3.61 –3.89 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.06 –0.31 –0.11
HeavyMnfc –3.29 –22.54 –12.97 –0.47 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.16 –0.75 –0.12
Util_Cons –0.08 7.26 6.91 1.02 –0.09 –0.08 –0.06 –0.23 –0.09 –0.38
TransComm 0.62 2.27 2.79 –0.21 –0.05 –0.04 –0.02 –0.03 –0.17 –0.16
Other services –0.37 5.68 1.13 –0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.08and light industry sectors, and as do the truck and textile/ap-
parel industries in Kazakhstan). Additionally, the trade bal-
ance worsens by almost US$11 billion in Russia, by more
than US$800 million in Belarus,10 and by almost US$800
million in Kazakhstan. As before, the rest of the world is just
marginally affected, albeit sectoral effects of importance may
again be found in Ukraine, a trade partner for whom the
EurAsEC CU is an important market.11
Finally, we estimate the results of a full harmonization of
the energy sectors trade tax treatment, parallel to creation of
the CU. These results are shown in table 5.12
Again, the results are unambiguously negative for all CU
members, and again Belarus has the greatest GDP losses
among all countries. Nevertheless, the GDP losses are halved
for both Belarus and Russia when compared with the previ-
ous scenario. That result may reflect both economies adjust-
ing away from the suboptimal allocation of resources. For in-
stance,  that  led  Belarus  to  concentrate  excessively  in
economic sectors for which it has no real or only limited
comparative advantages. This process may help erase some
of the trade-diversion GDP losses caused by creating the
EurAsEC CU, but it doesn’t hide the underlying GDP-
reducing nature of the arrangement. The sectoral pattern of
results is again similar to the previous scenarios (that is, over-
whelmingly negative), as are the ones in the non-CU trade
partners. Finally, the trade balance worsens by almost US$11
billion in Russia, close to US$600 million in Belarus, and
more than US$$800 million in Kazakhstan.
Conclusions
In this brief note, an initial estimation of some of the eco-
nomic effects of the creation of the EurAsEC CU was per-
formed, using the GTAP CGE model. The simulations pre-
sented here have some weaknesses and limitations, sug  gesting
that the results should be seen as more indicative than pre-
scriptive. Nevertheless, the results of all different scenarios
consistently support the conclusion that, as an arrangement,
the EurAsEC CU would be a GDP-reducing framework
wherein the negative trade-diversion effects clearly over-
whelm any positive trade-creation effects. In general, GDP
falls and most industries are negatively affected by the
arrangement (regardless of the assumptions used) and the
external positions of the CU members worsen. This result
5 POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
Source: Author’s estimations.
Table 5. Simulation Results of Full CU
GDP CHANGES
Russian  Rest of
Federation Belarus Kazakhstan Ukraine China Rest of Asia Americas EU-27 Africa the world
–0.66 –2.77 –0.54 0.11 –0.04 0.00 0.00 –0.04 0.00 –0.12
Sector Output changes per sector
Petrol –9.32 34.63 26.76 10.26 0.10 –0.07 0.39 0.33 0.41 0.80
GasOil –1.40 –39.31 –2.17 –4.84 0.27 0.09 0.01 0.56 0.14 0.36
Financial 2.01 –2.62 –0.26 –0.49 0.01 –0.01 0.00 0.00 –0.04 0.03
Truck –1.20 –4.76 10.65 –6.50 0.08 0.10 –0.03 0.05 –0.43 0.36
Auto 5.49 –3.83 –22.96 –3.95 –0.02 0.00 –0.06 –0.07 –0.07 –0.24
GrainsCrops 0.14 –0.47 –5.63 –0.82 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.13
MeatLstk 0.57 0.26 0.01 –0.79 0.01 0.01 –0.10 –0.01 0.01 0.04
Extraction 1.13 –7.53 –3.02 –0.68 –0.01 –0.07 –0.01 0.00 –0.06 –0.03
ProcFood –1.54 –1.67 –2.51 –2.73 0.20 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.19
TextWapp 2.16 –19.49 3.61 –3.08 –0.12 0.13 0.04 0.07 –0.16 0.08
LightMnfc 3.11 –14.93 –3.44 –4.91 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 –0.06 0.03
HeavyMnfc –1.70 –12.18 –11.26 –1.02 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.07 –0.20 0.04
Util_Cons 0.28 5.91 7.09 1.28 –0.09 –0.03 –0.05 –0.24 –0.10 –0.45
TransComm 0.95 3.93 2.94 –0.30 –0.04 –0.03 –0.02 –0.05 –0.11 –0.20
Other services –0.15 11.75 1.16 –0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.09compares poorly with the largely positive effects arising
from multilateral trade integration (such as WTO accession13
and free trade areas with the EU).14
Notes
1. For an overview of the expected effects of Russia’s
WTO entry, see Alekseev et al. (2004); for the effects in Be-
larus, see Pavel and Tochitskaya (2005) or an earlier analysis
of  the  Belarus  case  by Vinhas  de  Souza  and  Bakanova
(2002). A recent overview of the trade relations between Be-
larus, the EU, and CIS/Russia is available at Tochitskaya and
Vinhas de Souza, (2009).
2. For another 376 CET tariff lines (mainly in textiles and
footwear) for all CU members, it was unclear if the CET in-
troduction would increase or decrease rates because of dif-
ferent national classifications for products. 
3. Specifically, the CIS share should be less than 15 per-
cent, although it actually is close to 50 percent—mostly as a
result of trade with Russia. Kazakhstan overtrades with the
CIS by 70 percent, whereas Russia’s share is the predicted
one. Conversely, Belarus significantly undertrades with the
EU, using almost half of its predicted trade share (see Shep-
otylo [2009]).
4. The GTAP model is a quasi-dynamic computable gen-
eral equilibrium (CGE) multiregion global trade model, in
which interregional links come mostly from bilateral trade
flows, and input-output and social accounting matrixes rep-
resent the countries’ different productive structures. See
Hertel and Tsigas (1997) for a comprehensive description.
A CGE model is a state-of-the-art workhorse tool for simu-
lation analyses of the effects of the creation of regional trade
agreements.
5. The CIS countries now included in the GTAP are Ar-
menia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzs-
tan, Russia, and Ukraine. Therefore, all EurAsEC CUs are in
the data set. This expansion of the GTAP database toward
the CIS was one of the main aims of one of the working
packages of the EU “Eastern Neighbourhood: Economic Po-
tential and Future Development” project. This particular
working package (namely, “Analysis of the Economic and In-
stitutional Consequences of WTO Accession and of Future
EU-CIS Free Trade Agreements”) was designed by Lúcio
Vinhas de Souza while at the Kiel Institute for World Econ-
omy, one of the partners in that project.
6. This also includes long-term questions—such as the
granting of exports and imports monopoly rights (fully ex-
cluded from the CU competences); and in Russia, where gas
exports are a state monopoly, this situation will not be af-
fected by the CU creation.
7. Those GDP results should be seen as a percentage
change in relation to a non-CU benchmark.
8. Those results should be seen as a percentage change in
the output of the sector in relation to a non-CU benchmark.
9. For a description of the terms of the Belarus-Russia en-
ergy trade, see Gatovsky and Kashinskaya (2006); for an
analysis of the energy trade between Russia and the CIS
countries, see Lysenko and Vinhas de Souza (2007). In De-
cember 2010, an agreement was announced between Be-
larus and Russia in which Russia would continue to provide
Belarus with a tax-free amount of oil for domestic consump-
tion, and Belarus would be responsible for collecting and
transferring to the Russian treasury revenues of processed oil
products exported from its territory. (It should be noted
that, as of late-January 2011, the actual terms of the agree-
ment are still being negotiated.)
10. For Belarus—the country among EurAsEC CU mem-
bers with by far the most fragile external position (that is,
systematically very large trade and current account deficits
and low foreign currency reserves)—that would have im-
plied in 2010 an increase in the trade deficit from an already
huge 14 percent to approximately 17 percent of GDP.
11. The positive effect in the Ukraine petrol industry that
partially compensates for the negative effects elsewhere
may just reflect the nonadjustment of the terms of trade in
some energy products. The sector does not operate under
full market conditions, given external subsides (by Russia)
and domestic cross-subsidisation (see Lysenko and Vinhas
de Souza [2007]).
12. All estimations presented in this report underwent
several types of robustness analysis (reestimation of the mod-
els by robust multistep solution algorithms, which reduce lin-
earization errors) and sensitivity analysis (to parameter and
shock values); and these analyses confirmed the results.
13. On December 7, 2010, Russia signed an agreement
with the EU that, in principle, eliminates the remaining out-
standing bilateral issues in the Russian WTO accession ne-
gotiations. This agreement might open the way for a WTO
entry by 2011-12, finalizing a process that has lasted for
more than 17 years (and thereby achieving the dubious dis-
tinction of being the longest accession process in the history
of the WTO).
14. Among many sources, see Alekseev et al. (2004); Pavel
and Tochitskaya (2005); and Tochitskaya and Vinhas de
Souza (2009).
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